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the imposition of criminal sanctions,"3 and has held that due process
requires the use of at least some of the same protections that the
citizen would have in a criminal trial .3 However, the extension of this
line of authority might prove too inflexible. There will be circumstan-
ces where the agency is justified in holding closed hearings. Perhaps
the optimum resolution of the problem would be to couple a presump-
tion in favor of open hearings with the extension of the Goldberg
balancing test utilized by the Fitzgerald court. The presumption
would recognize the policy arguments favoring open hearings by shift-
ingtheburden to the Government to show a legitimate governmental
interest for restricting access, and the balancing test would permit the
court to weigh, on a case by case basis, the competing interests.35
C. USE OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND THE "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE"
STANDARD
Richardson v. Perales' and its attendant trilogy of lower court
opinions2 reflect the constant friction in administrative law generated
by a mounting case load and a conscious effort to insure justice in
each individual proceeding. The final decision established that uncor-
roborated hearsay can constitute "substantial evidence" sufficient to
support an administrative ruling.
36. Williams v. Zuckert, 371 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting), vacated and
remanded, 372 U.S. 765 (1963).
37. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1958) (granting right to hearing where accusers
could be confronted and cross-examined); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (granting right
to appeal from unfavorable agency ruling).
38. It is entirely possible that the court of appeals will not reach the issue of an open hearing
on the appeal of the Fitzgerald decision. The doctrine that a litigant must exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies before judicial appeal, enunciated in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 (1937), applies to employment-discharge cases. E.g., American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Resor, 442 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971); Hills v. Eisenhart, 256 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.
1958); Green v. Baughman, 214 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The district court held that
Fitzgerald represented one of the exceptions to the exhaustion principle-that established ave-
nues for review may be bypassed "where an adequate remedy for the issue in question would not
exist after the agency action. See Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1970). The court
felt that the "probability of unfairness" presented by non-public proceedings would not lend
itself to later judicial review. - F. Supp. at - The court of appeals may reverse on the
exhaustion issue and remand this case to the Civil Service Commission for completion of
hearings.
1. 402 U.S. 389 (1971), noted in The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 326
(1971).
2. Cohen v. Perales, 412 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1250 (1969), noted
in 1970 Duke Project 153; Perales v. Secretary, 288 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Tex. 1968).
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In 1966 Perales filed for social security benefits which he alleged
were due him because a lumbar injury he had suffered made it impos-
sible for him to engage in "any gainful activity. 3 When notified that
the claim had been disapproved by the state agency, Perales requested
an administrative hearing before an examiner of the Bureau of Hear-
ings and Appeals of the Social Security Administration. Two hear-
ings ensued at which the only evidence adverse to Perales consisted
of medical reports and evaluations submitted by physicians who had
treated and/or examined Perales and the findings of a "medical ex-
aminer" who collated and interpreted these reports for the examiner.
All of this material was hearsay which was objected to as a denial of
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses as guarantepd by
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).4 Per.ales testified in his own
behalf and introduced the oral testimony of another physician who
had treated him. The hearing examiner denied the claim and this
decision was later affirmed by the Appeals Council.
An appeal was subsequently lodged with a federal district court
which asserted its reluctance to accept as "substantial evidence" the
opinions of medical experts in the form of unsworn written reports
and dismissed the opinion of the medical examiner as of little proba-
tive value,5 particularly when opposed by the testimony of an appear-
ing witness. The district court concluded that the administrative pro-
ceedings amounted to "pyramiding hearsay upon hearsay" and re-
manded the case for a new hearing.'
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower
court holding that uncorroborated hearsay evidence is not sufficient
to meet the "substantial evidence" standard.7 Recognizing that hear-
say evidence is clearly admissible in administrative proceedings before
the Social Security Administration,' the court reasoned that such
admission did not deny a claimant's right of cross-examination inas-
much as the hearing examiner has the power to subpoena witnesses
3. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(l)(B) (1970).
4. A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, and
to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970).
5. 288 F. Supp. at 314. The court did indicate that hearsay evidence could be accepted as
substantial evidence "in unusual circumstances" but it did not indicate what these circumstan-
ces would be. Id.
6. Id.
7. 412 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1969).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1970); 20 C.F.R. § 404.927 (1971).
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sua sponte or upon the request of a party.9 If such a request is not
made, however, a party may not later object to admission of the
hearsay evidence. In regard to the "substantial evidence" standard,
the court cited the definition enunciated by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.'0
[F]indings by administrative bodies means evidence which is substantial,
that is, affording a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can
be reasonably inferred. . . . Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and
must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be estab-
lished. . . . [a]nd it must be enough to justify, if the trial wbre to a jury, a
refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is
one of fact for the jury. .... .
Focusing upon the application of this standard to hearsay, the court
relied upon the pronouncement in Consolidated Edison Co. v.
NLRB 2 to the effect that "[m]ere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor
does not constitute substantial evidence." 13 The court disparaged the
use of a medical examiner to interpret the reports of examining physi-
cians and dismissed the probative value of the testimony of such an
expert because "[m]ultiple hearsay is no more competent than single
hearsay." 14 Substantial evidence was deemed lacking, and the lower
court opinion was affirmed. Denying a rehearing of the Perales case,
the Fifth Circuit in a per curiam opinion 15 clarified its stand on uncor-
roborated hearsay by stating that evidence of this nature may provide
a basis for an adverse administrative ruling but not where standing
alone and opposed by objection and oral testimony as in Perales.1
In the final appellate proceeding,' the Supreme Court affirmed
the lower court as to the admissibility of hearsay in administrative
hearings" but reversed as to the "substantial evidence" issue, holding
9. 412 F.2d at 51.
10. 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
11. Id. at 299-300.
12. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
13. Id. at 230. The statement has been echoed in a number of subsequent decisions. Eg.,
Camero v. United States, 345 F.2d 798, 800 (Ct. Cl. 1965); NLRB v. Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, 202 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1953); Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676,
691 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); United States v. Krumsiek, Ill F.2d 74, 78
(1st Cir. 1940); Hill v. Fleming, 169 F. Supp. 240,245 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
14. 412 F.2d at 53.
15. 416 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1969).
16. Id. at 1251.
17. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
18. The consensus as to the admissibility of hearsay in administrative hearings shown in
the Perales decisions, including the Supreme Court dissent, reflects both congressional intent
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that hearsay medical reports may indeed constitute "substantial evid-
ence" within the ambit of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act.,9
In support of the latter determination, the majority was impressed
both by the wide range of medical examinations, most at government
expense, to which claimant had been subjected and by the fact that
the evidence was derived from unbiased physicians who had person-
ally examined the claimant. The majority thus concluded that the
resulting detailed reports were based on accepted medical procedures
and were of value to an adjudicative body. The Court felt that the
circumstances indicated a careful and patient endeavor by the agency
and examiner to ascertain the truth and the Court was impressed by
the consistent results of the independent and specialized examinations.
Further, in concurring with the Fifth Circuit on the availability of
cross-examination through the examiner's subpoena power, the ma-
jority pointed out that claimant had failed to utilize this power despite
ample opportunity to examine the documentary evidence on file.
From this it followed that he could not later complain of inability to
cross-examine witnesses. Noting the burden on administrative funds
and the growing dissatisfaction with exclusionary evidentiary rules in all types of judicial and
administrative proceedings. In addition to the Social Security Act, see note 8 supra, the APA
similarly allows any documentary evidence to be received unless irrelevant, immaterial and
unduly repetitious. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). The courts have adopted a similar position even
when there are no specific agency regulations applicable to the issue. For example, the Supreme
Court early determined that because of its investigative duties the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was not bound by the exclusionary rules. ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904). The trend
of recent decisions is reflected in that portion of Morelli v. United States holding that "the
hearsay rule is not applicable to administrative hearings so long as the evidence upon which a
decision is ultimately based is both substantial and has probative value." 177 Ct. Cl. 848, 853-
54 (1966).
The legislative provisions and judicial rulings complement growing criticism of the exclu-
sionary rules, particularly the hearsay restrictions, even in jury trials. See generally C. McCOR-
MICK, EVIDENCE 634 (1954); 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8c (3d ed. 1940). Unfortunately, the
new proposed federal rules do not recognize this approach, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules
of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), but
the Fifth Circuit has admitted a newspaper account to establish the damaging of a courthouse
by fire, declaring that this evidence was not being received as an exception to the hearsay rule
but "because it [was] necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material, and its admission [was]
within the trial judge's exercise of discretion in holding the hearing within reasonable bounds."
Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1961). The
same may be said of much evidence presented in administrative hearings, particularly medical
reports. McCormick correctly notes that the exclusionary rules "are absurdly inappropriate to
any tribunal or proceeding where there is no jury." 5 ENCYCL. Soc. Sci. 637, 644 (1931).
Certainly, such jury-protecting exclusionary rules need not be adopted or encouraged in admin-
istrative proceedings. 2 DAViS 264.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970).
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of producing live testimony, the Court pointed out prior instances
where the reliability and probative worth of written medical reports
in formal trials had been recognized and the reports admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule.2 1 More importantly, a number of deci-
sions were cited in which courts, reviewing administrative rulings, had
upheld adverse decisions despite the fact that the sole supporting evid-
ence consisted of reports of the variety in question, occasionally, but
not always, buttressed by testimony of a medical adviser as in the
Perales situation. Such cases indicated the acceptability of medical
reports as a basis for social security determinations .2 In view of these
precedents, the Court stated that the lower court had read too much
into the Consolidated Edison definition of "substantial evidence. ' 2
The majority also took issue with the Fifth Circuit on the use, of
medical advisers and recognized their value as interpreters of complex
medical evidence for a lay examiner.
The dissenting opinion cited with approval the holding of
Consolidated Edison that "[u]ncorroborated hearsay .. .does not
by itself constitute 'substantial evidence' "2 and emphasized that
cross-examination of the reporting physicians was "essential to a full
and fair disclosure of the facts." The dissent went on to characterize
the use of medical advisers in such proceedings as "beneath the dig-
nity of a great nation. '"2 5
The Demise of the Legal Residuum Rule
Since the creation of the administrative process in the United
States in 1789,28 a standard has been sought by which to judicially
gauge the soundness of an administrative determination. The preva-
lent standards include the legal residuum rule and the requirement of
20. White v. Zutell, 263 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1959); Long v. United States, 59 F.2d 602 (4th
Cir. 1932).
21. E.g.,.Breaux v. Finch, 421 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1970); Flake v. Gardner, 399 F,2d 532
(9th Cir. 1968); Pierce v. Gardner, 388 F.2d 846 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 885 (1967);
McMillin v. Gardner, 384 F.2d 5.96 (10th Cir. 1967); Justice v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 998 (6th Cir.
1966); Brasher v. Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1965); Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d
Cir. 1964); Cuthrell v. Celebrezze, 330 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1964); Stancavage v. Celebrezze, 323
F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1963).
22. 402 U.S. at 407.
23. Id. at 413. See also Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 197 1).
24. 402 U.S. at 412 (Justices Douglas, Black and Brennan dissenting).
25. Id. at 413.
26. The first administrative agency was established by the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29,
to estimate duties on imports.
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substantial evidence.Y The origin of the former standard is found in
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. 29 wherein the New York Court of
Appeals, in interpreting a state statute on administrative hearings,
ruled that while a commission could "accept any evidence that is
offered, still in the end there must be a residuum of legal evidence to
support the claim before an award can be made. ' 29 Basically, the rule
requires a reviewing court to set aside an administrative finding unless
such finding is supported by evidence which would be admissible in a
jury trial-no matter how reliable the evidence introduced, no matter
what the circumstances and no matter what opposing evidence was
presented.3" The premise of the rule appears to be that a strict require-
ment to set aside decisions based on evidence which would be inadmis-
sible in a jury trial is superior to a separate evaluation of the probative
weight of such evidence in each particular case. This assumption has
been severely criticized for several reasons.3 1 As Professor Davis
points out, the rule denies hearsay in an administrative hearing its
probative value, which could be as great as that attached to incom-
petent evidence admitted without objection in a jury trial.32 The
restriction also precludes experts who are members of the tribunal
from drawing conclusions from evidence that could be utilized
for drawing conclusions by an expert witness testifying before a
jury. 33 More importantly, however, the evidence is often reliable and
its value should be assessed in the light of attendant circumstances
rather than being summarily excluded by an inflexible rule.34 In addi-
27. Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings,
1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 23.
28. 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
29. Id. at 440, 113 N.E. at 509.
30. 2 DAvis 292.
31. See R. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEw YORK 189-
92 (1942); 2 DAVIS 293; 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 39 (3d ed. 1940). But see 1 F. COOPER, STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 411 (1965). See generally United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 688
(2d Cir. 1955); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 626-27 (1954); J. WIGMORE, supra, § 4b.
32. 2 DAVIS 293. See also, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126
(1941); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
33. 2 DAVIS 293. See also, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 175 Mass.
257, 56 N.E. 288 (1900).
34. 2 DAVIS 293-94. Professor Davis suggests that the circumstances to be evaluated include:
the alternative to relying on the incompetent evidence; the state of the supporting and opposing
evidence; the program policy being administered and the effects of the decision; the relative
importance of the subject matter and government economy; and the efficacy or lack thereof of
cross-examination in regard to given hearsay evidence. Id.
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tion to being criticized, the legal residuum rule has been weakened by
developments in regard to the sufficiency and acceptance of hearsay
in the trial field.3 5
Although the majority of federal jurisdictions reject the legal re-
siduum rule 38 several recent cases 37 approving it in broad generaliza-
tions have prompted the observation that "the federal case law does
not support an unqualified statement that the residuum rule is uni-
formly rejected." ' 3 Prior to Perales, the only Supreme Court pro-
nouncement on the subject appears to be the dictum of Justice Bran-
deis in Tisi v. Tod 39 to the effect that an administrative finding need
not be based on evidence legally sufficient in a court of law. The
Perales decision, by sustaining a ruling based solely upon hearsay
medical reports, should remove all doubt as to the applicability of the
residuum rule to judicial review of federal administrative proceed-
ings. This decision provides a welcome answer to the controversy and
insures a greater uniformity in review procedures among the federal
courts.
The "Substantial Evidence" Standard
The first version of the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial
review is attributed to the Federal Trade Commission Act of 19 14;40
since ihat date, at least eighteen other federal statutes have incorpo-
rated it." The substantial evidence rule is not a rule of evidence," but
instead requires that the evidence furnished provide "a substantial
35. For example, hearsay has been held in special circumstances to be of such probative
value as to support a criminal conviction, United States v. Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), and to justify dismissal of a federal employee, Jenkins v. Macy, 357 F.2d 62 (8th Cir.
1966). Also, probable cause for an arrest may be premised entirely on hearsay. Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
36. E.g., Marmon v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 218 F.2d 716,717 (3d Cir. 1955); American
Rubber Products Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F.2d 47, 51 (7th Cir. 1954); Ellers v. Railroad Retire-
ment Bd., 132 F.2d 636, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1943); and cases cited in note 20 supra. See also 2
DAVIS (Supp. 1970) 309-10.
37. E.g., Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 154, 169-70 (8th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Yutana Barge Lines, 315 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Englander Co., 260 F.2d
67,71 (9th Cir. 1958); Hill v. Fleming, 169 F. Supp. 240,245 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
38. 2 DAVIS 303.
39. 264 U.S. 131 (1924).
40. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 720, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
41. Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026, 1027
(1941).
42. Patterson, Hearsay and the Substantial Evidence Rule in the Federal Administrative
Process, 13 MERCER L. REV. 294, 307 (1962).
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basis of fact from which the fact in issue can reasonably be in-
ferred. '43 The substantial evidence proviso adopted in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act of 1946 largely codified the definition of the
rule developed in case law.4 4 Unfortunately, some decisions had incor-
porated the residuum rule into the concept of "substantial evidence,"
and this rule continued to exert an influence even after the enactment
of the APA.45 In regard to the exclusionary rules, particularly hear-
say, it appears that different criteria are still applied by reviewing
courts depending upon whether private rights, such as alien claims,
or the activity of a regulatory agency, whose purpose is promotion
of general public welfare, are in issue.46 The "substantial evidence"
standard has also been colored to some degree by the tendency of
courts to rely, at least in cases where private rights are involved, on
common law rules of evidence. 47
By expunging the residuum restriction from the concept of "sub-
stantial evidence," Perales indicates that hearsay may constitute sub-
stantial evidence depending upon its reliability and probative value.48
Though the court does not attempt to delineate the parameters of
hearsay which would constitute substantial evidence, it notes with
approval that Consolidated Edison,49 a case upon which the lower
court opinions and the Supreme Court dissent relied so heavily, held
that material "without a basis in evidence having rational probative
force" did not constitute "substantial evidence."50 Perales indicates
what hearsay evidence will not constitute substantial evidence, but
provides little guidance as to the degree of reliability and probative
value required to meet the substantial evidence standard. 51 In any
event the existence of the examiner's subpoena power insures the
43. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. NLRB, 93 F.2d 985, 989 (4th Cir. 1938).
44. See Western Paper Makers' Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 268 (1926); United
States v. Abilene & S. Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924); Spiller v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 253 U.S.
117 (1920); ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913); ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 40 F.2d 921 (W.D. Pa. 1930); Beaumont, S.L. & W. Ry.
v. United States, 36 F.2d 789 (W.D. Mo. 1929), affd, 282 U.S. 74 (1930); Montrose Oil Ref.
Co. v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 25 F.2d 750 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 25 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1927),
cert. denied, 277 U.S. 598 (1928). See also Patterson, note 42 supra, at 306-15.
45. See note 13 supra.
46. See Patterson, note 42 supra, at 315.
47. E.g., Bullock v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 19 F. Supp. 862 (W.D. Minn. 1937).
48. For an analysis of this approach, see Patterson, note 42 supra, at 343.
49. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
50. Id. at 230.
51. See the circumstances suggested for evaluation by Professor Davis, note 34 supra.
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opportunity to cross-examine as long as adverse evidence to be pre-
sented is available for inspection. This access to cross-examination is
adequate because "the requirement . . . is not that the witness be
cross-examined, but only that the opponent have opportunity to cross-
examine." 52 Thus, the Perales decision represents a sound liberaliza-
tion of administrative procedure by a realistic appraisal of the proba-
tive worth of hearsay in view of the attendant circumstances. The
ruling should increase the efficiency of the administrative process
while preserving procedural safeguards.
D. RIGHT To A COMPARATIVE HEARING
In Citizens Communications Center v. FCC' the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit held that an FCC policy state-
ment 2 which denied full comparative hearings 3 to mutually exclusive4
52. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence ii the Administrative Process, 55 HARy.
L. REv. 364, 380 (1942). See generally The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. Rav. 3,
328 (1971).
1. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), noted in Comment, Implications of Citizens Communi-
cations Center v. FCC, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1500 (1971). The Citizens Communications Center
(CCC) and Black Efforts for Soul in Television (BEST), a co-petitioner, are non-profit citizens'
groups organized for the purpose of representing the public interest in proceedings before the
FCC. After the Commission had denied their request to reconsider its 1970 Policy Statement,
discussed at notes 7-11 infra and accompanying text, see Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24
F.C.C.2d 383, 19 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1902 (1970), CCC and BEST petitioned the court of
appeals for review of the statement and related opinions and orders of the Commission. 447
F.2d at 1202 n.2; Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 355, 18 P & F RADIO REG.
2D 1523 (1970). The court consolidated this petition with petitions to review the 1970 statement
filed by Hampton Roads Television Corp. and Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc., two
applicants for television channels who had filed in competition with renewal applicants. In a
third consolidated case, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction at the district court level, CCC and
BEST sought to enjoin the FCC from making any change in the standards applicable to
comparative broadcast license renewal hearings without first giving all interested parties notice
and an opportunity to be heard pursuant to § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1970). In light of the decision discussed herein, the court held that this case was moot.
Two intervenors, RKO General, Inc. and WTAR Radio TV Corp., filed briefs defending the
policy statement and subsequent FCC actions.
2. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Appli-
cants [1970 Policy Statement], 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1901 (1970).
3. A comparative hearing involves a determination of the relative qualifications of two or
more applicants. All parties participating in such a comparative determination have the right
to support their allegations by argument and by proof, if necessary. Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373, 386 (1908).
4. Applications are mutually exclusive "if the grant of one effectively precludes the other."
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327,330 (1945). This situation arises most commonly
[Vol. 1972:115
